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Abstract/Summary 
 
Energy justice has recently emerged as a new crosscutting social science research 
agenda. In this chapter, its core tenets are explored: distributional, procedural and 
recognition justice. Using a case study approach of nuclear waste in Canada, nuclear 
reactors in the UK, and uranium mines in Australia, the manifestations of energy justice 
in practice are illustrated from a political economy perspective through analysing the 
nuclear energy sector. This focus allows us to identify both winners and losers with 
regards to energy justice throughout the nuclear energy system. Through promoting the 
application of this triple-pronged approach across the energy system and within the 
global context of energy production and consumption, recommendations for its 
operationalisation are advanced. Of significance, the political economy focus highlights 
the key areas for conflicts and trade-offs amongst the core tenets of energy justice as 
the concept makes policy ground. 
 
 
“The Political Economy of Energy Justice: A Nuclear Energy Perspective” 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Energy justice has recently emerged as a new crosscutting social science 
research agenda, which seeks to apply justice principles to energy policy, energy 
production, energy consumption, energy activism, energy security and climate change. 
It aims ‘to provide all individuals across all areas with safe, affordable and sustainable 
energy’1 (p. 1), and carries three core tenets, distributional, procedural and justice as 
recognition. Within this chapter, we begin by exploring these core tenets of energy 
justice, as they are understood in academic theory. Using three case studies throughout 
the nuclear energy system, we then illustrate manifestations of energy justice in practice 
from a political economy perspective.  
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We use our case studies to test three hypotheses. Firstly, that potential trade-
offs will exist between the core tenets of energy justice. Here we give the example of 
the siting of Deep Geological Repository for Canadian nuclear waste and the 
complexity of balancing distributional and procedural justice calls. Secondly, that a 
political economy approach to energy justice can resolve the political economy 
dilemma of having winners and losers from an energy policy perspective. We illustrate 
our reasoning through a case study of the development of the UK Energy Act 2013. 
Thirdly and finally, we show potential for the deployment of one tenet to mask another. 
Here, our example of the recognition of indigenous groups surrounding uranium mines 
highlights the necessity of not only attention to who is involved in decision-making, 
but the legitimacy of social inclusion.  
 
In utilising a political economy perspective throughout, we therefore identify 
both winners and losers with regards to energy justice throughout the nuclear energy 
system. The modern political economy research agenda, and within, the concept of the 
international political economy or global political economy, first appeared as a subfield 
of international relations in the 1970s. Emerging primarily with a focus on the 
interrelationship between public and private power in the allocation of scarce resources, 
it sought to answer the fundamental questions of ‘who gets what, when and how?’. 
Thus it questions, in essence, who the winners and losers are in fundamentally 
intertwined political and economic choices.2 (p.18) 
 
Our discussion leads us to provide two insights into the debates surrounding 
energy justice. Firstly, we demonstrate that energy justice offers an opportunity to 
explore where injustices occur – highlighting the maldistribution of burdens and 
benefits and allowing for the development of new processes of avoidance and 
remediation as well as the recognition of new actors. It is therefore an agenda that 
inspires both evaluative accounts and normative solutions to dealing with both the 
winners and losers in energy policy. Secondly, through exploration of these case 
studies, we illustrate the international scope of energy justice concerns across all 
sections of the nuclear energy system. Thus, we highlight that energy justice provides 
a new framework for bridging existing and future research on energy production and 
consumption. Here, the hitherto competing discourses are united in the common goal 
of achieving just energy-based processes and outcomes.  
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On this basis, we promote the application of energy justice’s three core tenets, 
distribution, procedure and recognition - a three-pronged framework - for assessing the 
winners and losers across the energy system. Throughout, our political economy focus 
leads us to highlight the potential for conflicts and trade-offs amongst the core tenets 
of energy justice. Further, it not only provided cautionary tales around the 
implementation of energy justice tenets, but also demonstrates how energy justice may 
be used as a positive tool for resolving political economy issues. Indeed, we don’t claim 
that the emerging concept of energy justice provides a panacea for our energy concerns; 
instead, we draw attention to the need to explore and consider its own political economy 
as the concept makes policy ground.  
 
2. Energy Justice: The Tenets 
Generally, justice theory rests upon three tenets: distributional justice, procedural 
justice, and justice as recognition.  
2.1. Distributional Justice 
 
Distributional justice, the first of three tenets of energy justice, recognises the inherently 
spatial nature of the concept. It includes attention to both the physically unequal 
allocation of environmental benefits and ills, and the uneven distribution of their 
associated responsibilities3  and recognises that issues in specific localities become 
entwined with the desirability of technologies more generally4. Further, it represents a 
call for the even distribution of benefits and ills on all members of society regardless 
of income, race, etc.  
 
This first tenet of energy justice fits classically with the concept of political 
economy, which, in questioning, ‘who gets what, when and how?’2 (p. 18), is primarily 
concerned with questions of distribution. Nancy Fraser highlights this focus in her work 
‘Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition and 
Participation’, where she states, ‘the redistribution paradigm focuses on injustices it 
defines as social-economic and presumes to be rooted in the political economy.  
Examples include exploitation, economic marginalisation and deprivation’. 5 (p. 73) In 
this regard, both distributive justice as a tenet of energy justice and the political 
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economy agenda, call to question where the benefits and burdens of our energy 
infrastructures lie. 
 
Such distributional concerns typically emerge as public opposition to energy 
developments and therefore highlight instances of injustice. Research has demonstrated 
the unequal placement of nuclear facilities in areas of low-income, for example, and in 
the case of waste storage, the contamination of Native American Lands. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 We 
highlight, however, the importance of noting the distributing of benefits too and their 
role in creating injustice, thus recognising both winners and losers. Conflict 
surrounding community wind farm developments has stimulated interest in 
‘community benefits’, for example – the provision of material and financial benefits by 
developers to local communities.11  
 
2.2. Procedural justice 
 
Energy justice requires the use of equitable procedures that engage all stakeholders in 
a non-discriminatory way.3,12 It states that all groups should be able to participate in 
decision making, and that their contributions should be taken seriously throughout. It 
also requires participation, impartiality and full information disclosure by government 
and industry13, and the use of appropriate and sympathetic engagement mechanisms. 14 
 
Our aim here is to assess the extent to which such a procedural justice is 
observable in energy policy and to what degree there is energy justice from a political 
economy perspective. In essence, this involves assessing who the potential winners and 
losers may be in terms of procedural justice. We note, however, that the aim should not 
be to look at one case of procedural justice in isolation, it is necessary to look at the 
entire energy cycle, as is evidenced by our discussion in the sections below. 
 
Firstly and in brief, we take the example of energy subsidies, where there is an 
the issue of full information disclosure, questioning, in particular, whether the public 
are in full knowledge of what subsidies different energy sources in the energy sector 
receive. Analysis was undertaken in the United Kingdom (by the UK Environmental 
Audit Committee) to determine the exact levels of subsidies that are being received by 
different energy sources in the UK, and how this could then inform public decision-
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making on what represents the best choice of energy for the future.15 However, there 
was not a conclusive outcome. The IEA has also produced a well-documented analysis 
that identifies that the fossil fuel industry receives $550 billion annually.16 Despite this, 
however, there continues to remain a lack of core procedural justice elements of 
participation, impartiality and full information disclosure by government and industry 
on the issue of energy subsidies, and the energy sector remains significantly skewed in 
favour of fossil fuels as a result.  
 
Such information disclosure should be readily accessible so that all stakeholders 
can access informed decision-making as to what energy sources we should have. This 
is especially relevant given the notable affect of subsidy costs of societal welfare, as is 
discussed in Farrell and Lyons’ 17  exploration of renewables subsidies in Ireland. 
Nevertheless, there is a lack of research into the access to knowledge of energy 
subsidies by all stakeholders in the energy sector.18  
 
2.3. Justice as recognition 
 
The third tenet of energy justice is recognition justice or the injustice of misrecognition 
– originating also from Nancy Fraser’s ‘Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: 
Redistribution, Recognition and Participation’.5 Misrecognition is not the same as a 
lack of participation, instead manifesting as ‘the process of disrespect, insult and 
degradation that devalue some people and some places identities in comparison to 
others’.3 (p. 615) Recognition justice is also more than tolerance, and states that 
individuals must be fairly represented, that they must be free from physical threats and 
that they must be offered complete and equal political rights.  
 
 From an unconventional energy systems perspective, under-represented health 
impacts exist for communities who are often based in a developing world context. 
Health problems due to poor indoor climate from burning of traditional fuels impact 
women and children disproportionately, due to gender roles and division of household 
chores.19,20 Furthermore, the task of collecting firewood tends to be the responsibility 
of women and children, who spend hours every day collecting wood.21 Further, in terms 
of conventional energy systems, the renewable power industry and environmental 
NGOs often deride local campaigns against wind farms as ‘not-in-my-backyard’ 
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(NIMBY) protests by self-interested and misinformed individuals who care much less 
about the public good than about undisturbed scenery and property values.22 This not 
only denies respect and recognition justice for local anti-wind groups, but could also 
deepen public resistance to new forms of low-carbon energy installations. 
 
Recognition justice may therefore manifest itself not only as a failure to 
recognise, but also as misrecognising—a distortion of people’s views that may appear 
demeaning or contemptible. 23  Thus it includes calls to recognise the divergent 
perspectives rooted in social, cultural, ethnic, racial and gender differences. From this 
perspective, recognition justice scholarship challenges the predominantly universalist 
discourse of distribution and procedure, suggesting a terminology of distributive vs. 
post-distributive (or recognition) aspects of justice.24 Bulkeley and colleagues employ 
the post-distributive concept ‘to engage with how…justice is actually practiced and 
embedded in the city ... by moving from universal principles of climate justice to its 
articulation in particular places’, and to highlight the recognition aspect of justice.24 (p. 
25) 
 
3. Energy Justice in Practice: The Case of Nuclear Energy 
 
 
Here, we use three case studies to both illustrate the emergence of the tenets of energy 
justice in practice and to highlight the tensions that exist between them. We do so 
through firstly, an assessment of the siting process for a deep geological repository in 
Canada, secondly, consultation and due process around the development of the UK 
Energy Act 2013, and finally, the recognition of indigenous groups around Australian 
uranium mines. Our analysis seeks to demonstrate two points: (1) that the tenets of 
energy justice are subject to their own political economy at any one scale and (2) that a 
political economy perspective highlights many of the trade-offs that exist in the energy 
system and that need to be resolved to increase the practice of energy justice.  
 
3.1. Nuclear waste  Siting: A Canadian Case Study 
 
The fundamental underpinning of distributional justice is the idea of equality – the idea 
that everyone should be subject to the same amount of environmental burdens and 
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benefits.25  However, there is acknowledgement too that some resources are either 
naturally, or unavoidably, uneven in their distribution.26 This is true of nuclear waste. 
For technical, managerial and safety reasons, it is infeasible and unsafe to distribute 
nuclear waste equally amongst all those who benefit from nuclear energy.27 Potential 
sites for deep geological repositories are restricted by geological conditions, for 
example, meaning that some areas are practically more suitable than others.27 Thus, the 
unavoidable ‘stock-piling’ of nuclear waste necessitates that some people who live in 
communities neighbouring nuclear waste storage facilities face a disproportionate 
burden from the radioactive material.  
 
Where maldistribution is a necessity, then, claims for distributional justice must 
be made in tandem with an argument for fair treatment - procedural and recognition 
justice.26 Here, we use the case study of the siting of a Canadian Deep Geological 
Repository for nuclear waste as an example of the complexity of balancing 
distributional and procedural calls.  
 
Despite the acknowledgement amongst the scientific community that deep 
geological disposal is a safe means of disposing of radioactive waste, almost all 
countries that have tried to find a location for a repository site have failed.28 To date, 
only Finland and Sweden have made progress towards site development, with 
operations expected to begin sometime between 2020 and 2025, though developments 
are criticised for their lack of independent review and on the grounds of geological 
suitability.29,30 With plans across several countries to expand their nuclear fleet, plus 
several countries running out of storage space, and given that solutions to the nuclear 
waste legacy are a strong influence on attitudes to nuclear, a solution must be found. 
28,29 Canada in particular, has a long history of trying to find such a path.28  
 
Initial attempts to find a site for a Canadian deep geological repository (DGR) 
begun in the mid-1970s and initially took what Kojo and Richardson31 describe as a 
‘hierarchical approach’, the most extreme model of which is known as DAD – decide, 
announce and defend. Within the hierarchical approach, whilst it may contain elements 
of consultation and public engagement, the final decision on proceedings ultimately 
rests with state or federal authorities, which have the right to impose a facility on a 
community.31 By 1972, the then established committee of waste owners had already 
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decided that a DGR was a necessity. Indeed, the Canadian nuclear waste management 
program initially envisaged a timeline in which site selection and the early construction 
of a repository would have been completed in the late 1980s, with a fully operational 
site then expected around 2000.32 The initial actions of Atomic Energy Canada Limited, 
the overseeing body, demonstrated that they planned to move quickly on developments 
for a waste disposal site on the assumption that it this was the responsible thing to do. 
Durant32 (p.152) highlights here ‘the notion that because disposal was an, “urgent need”, 
and because sufficient technical means and know-how was available, public 
consultation was unnecessary’. 
  
However, in the midst of intense public opposition this program was halted in 
1981, and the decision was made that no disposal site would be identified before a full 
public inquiry on the disposal concept was held - the Seaborn panel.28,32 Reasons for 
objections can be numerous, arising over a desire not to contaminate pristine ground, 
tactical refusal in a bid to stop the development of future nuclear stations, NIMBYism 
- a refusal to host a facility in the local area despite recognition that the development of 
one is necessary, and because the siting process does not consider transparency or the 
sufficient involvement of affected peoples.28,33 
 
In a bid to overcome such opposition, the organisations responsible for the 
repository’s development changed tack. The Nuclear Waste Management Organisation 
(NWMO) was developed as an independent body tasked with investigating a DGR, the 
storage of materials above-ground at reactor sites in a centralised location, and, 
primarily, with achieving social acceptance.32 The NWMO created the process of 
Adaptive Phase Management, which moved away from a position in which technical 
and political elites held all decision-making rights, to one in which public stakeholders 
had a far greater role, with decision-making capacity granted to communities across 
time and space.32 The NWMO described the subsequent consultation process as a 
‘dialogue’, which included, ‘nation-wide surveys, focus groups, issue-focused 
workshops and roundtables, e-dialogues and deliberative surveys, and public 
information and discussion sessions’ to reach out to people, including specifically 
targeting indigenous populations.34 (p. 61) 
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Following a lengthy engagement phase, the NWMO is now in the process of 
identifying an informed and willing community to host the repository.28 The end result 
being that despite lengthy consultations and an on-going deliberative process, no site 
for a deep geological disposal facility has been found 40 years after the initial 
exploration of the DGR concept. This case study, whilst necessarily brief, demonstrates 
potential trade-offs between the tenets of energy justice, as calls for procedural justice 
significantly lengthen the progress for distributional justice. Ramana28 states that 
emerging conflicts between the principles underlying siting and the process of site 
selection itself may pose barriers for the successful establishment of a repository. Alley 
and Alley29 highlight, too, that even if a facility was opened tomorrow, it would take 
decades to transport all of the fuel to it, and that even then the transport of radioactive 
waste will undoubtedly itself be subject of opposition. In this regard, the demands for 
procedural justice in the development of a DGR have dampened its progress and, 
arguably, posed greater distributional risks since the nuclear waste destined for the 
DGR remains in above-ground, distributed, interim storage. 
 
3.2. Nuclear electricity supply: a British case study 
 
Energy justice requires that ‘people are provided with the opportunity to participate 
effectively and meaningfully in decisions concerning the production and distribution of 
energy…’ 30 (p. 121). Within this case we examine participation, consultation and due 
process using the example of the formulation of the UK Energy Act 2013. We highlight 
that through a focus on procedural justice, energy justice can resolve the political 
economy dilemma of having winners and losers from an energy policy perspective. 
 
The traditional meaning of the term political economy is that branch of the art 
of government concerned with the systematic inquiry into the nature and causes of the 
wealth of nations, although it is now often used loosely to describe political aspects of 
economic policy-making. It is this latter perspective that this section utilises to 
illuminate the political aspects of energy policy and legislation formulation in the UK 
and its consequences on energy justice in the energy sector.  
 
At its core the political economy concept has three central facets: institutions, 
information, and behaviour.35 Here we focus on the second - information - which is the 
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object of focus in political economy in the context of provision, revelation and 
aggregation. The nature of political economy allows for the analysis of why, how and 
what information is provided and its effects in terms of legislative and political 
decision-making; a necessity given that whilst information is important to any 
economic sector, it is even more so in energy activities where the risk is so high should 
a project fail or because of the long life-cycle of energy infrastructure (and the resulting 
level of potential environmental effects).  
 
The UK’s current energy policy - the Energy Act 201336  - was developed 
through a process of consultation lasting over a decade. While, in general, consultation 
has not been at the forefront of policy development, the UK did aim for a more inclusive 
process that involved the production of successive policy documents. In addition, there 
was a similar process to changing law in other areas, such as planning and climate 
change before the final introduction of the Energy Act 2013 was possible. Table 1 
outlines the major policy and legal developments over the decade prior to the Energy 
Act 2013. All stakeholders had access to significant information to inform and enhance 
their potential to make inputs into the process. 
 
Table 1: Policy and Legal Development in the Electricity Sector 
White Papers and Legislation 2002-2012 
2002 The Energy Review 
2002 Managing the Nuclear Legacy – A strategy for action 
2003 Energy White Paper: Our Energy Future—Creating a Low Carbon 
Economy 
2006 The Energy Challenge: Energy Review Report 2006 
2007 Energy White Paper on Energy 2007. Meeting the Energy Challenge 
2007 Planning for a Sustainable Future White paper 
2008 Meeting the Energy Challenge: A White Paper on Nuclear Power 
2008 Energy Act chapter 32 
2008 Climate Change Act chapter 27 
2008 Planning Act chapter 29 
2009 The UK Low Carbon Transition Plan: national strategy for climate and 
energy 
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2009 The Road to 2010: Addressing the nuclear question in the twenty first 
century 
2011 Planning our electric future: a White paper for secure, affordable and low-
carbon electricity 
 
The next few paragraphs detail the development of the UK Energy Act 2013 
and highlight that it was aimed at addressing the concerns of all stakeholders, to provide 
complete information to them, and to then result in energy law that was more just and 
equitable, rather than to identify clear winners and losers. The followings is a 
description of these steps: 
 
 The initial transition began and was greatly influenced by the 2002 Energy 
Review 37  and then in turn by the 2003 White Paper Our Energy Future: 
Creating a Low Carbon Economy.38  The 2002 and 2003 documents represented 
a shift in attitudes towards the UK’s energy strategy, framed in terms of a 
response to commitments made by the UK government to reduce carbon 
emissions, and to assess energy security. There was a particular reference to the 
need to build new energy infrastructure, and this was to involve the construction 
of a large number of renewable energy projects around the country.  
 
 In 2006, the UK government’s Department of Trade and Industry produced 
another Energy Review39, assessing the UK’s progress towards the medium and 
long-term goals of the 2003 Energy White Paper. The 2006 review reinforced 
the need to build more large-scale renewable projects and also represented a 
public shift in government attitudes towards nuclear energy, advocating an 
expansion of nuclear power through Generation III nuclear power plants. 
 
 In the 2007 White Paper Meeting the Energy Challenge the UK government set 
out its energy strategy, basing it on ‘tackling climate change’ and ‘ensuring 
secure, clean and affordable energy’ 40 (p. 6), a strategy that formed the basis of 
the 2008 Energy Act.41  The year 2008 was significant in that it also saw the 
creation of the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) to lead 
energy policy development in the UK. A new department had been considered 
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before, with Maugis and Nuttall42 noting that this type of reform had been an 
issue since 2003. DECC was given a Cabinet seat and was formed from the 
Climate Change Group in the Department for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs (Defra) and the Energy Group from the Department of Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR). Also in 2008, three other 
government outputs modified the UK’s approach to energy and energy 
infrastructure planning: the White Paper on Nuclear Power40; the Planning Act; 
and the Climate Change Act.43   
 
 In 2011, a new White Paper entitled Planning Our Electric Future was 
presented by the Department of Energy and Climate Change, and the key 
elements of this White Paper were intended to become law by 201344.  This 
White Paper was an attempt to develop a long-term energy policy in the UK, 
and alongside the 2011 White Paper, the Renewables Roadmap 45  detailed 
proposals for a major expansion of large-scale projects by 2020.  
 
 We illustrate here that each phase of the development of the UK Energy Act 
2013 over the previous decade involved several periods of consultation. The aim of the 
UK Government, by having core goals of consultation and due process, was to achieve 
a greater balance between economics (cost-focus), environment (climate change goals) 
and politics (energy security) so as to deliver a better outcome for society. All 
stakeholders were given equal opportunity to make an input to the process with 
extensive information being made available. Also there were more than several 
opportunities to be involved in the process.  
 
As a result the UK Energy Act 2013 is seen across Europe as a model for new 
energy law that aims to achieve a more ‘just’ energy policy (in essence energy justice), 
and which also aims to balance the competing objectives of economics, the 
environment and politics and thereby avoid having a policy outcome trade-off where 
there are winners and losers. 
 
Despite the apparent successes of the UK Energy Act 2013 process, however, 
Whitton et al.46 take a critical look at current legislative developments. They discuss 
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the proposed amendments to the UK planning and infrastructural law presented within 
the 2014-2015 Infrastructure Bill, and note a potential U-turn in infrastructural politics. 
They highlight in particular the suggestion that more decision-making powers for large-
scale developments, particularly in the low-carbon sector, will be returned to the 
Secretary of State – a threat to opportunities for local democracy. Energy justice in this 
regard is sensitive to political timescales and changes in political process, highlighting 
again that it is subject to its own political economy. 
 
Nevertheless, there is a counter argument in that in the energy policy literature 
where policy outcomes and the winners and losers are discussed there is too often a 
focus on nuclear energy and its pitfalls in comparison to other low-carbon energy 
sources, such as renewable energy. In Whitton et al. they ignore the phased 
development of the UK Energy Act 2013 and instead focus on how nuclear energy may 
benefit from a potential u-turn with the introduction of the 2014-2015 Infrastructure 
Bill. This ignores how this U-turn (though it is not a U-turn as in fact it is just a further 
clarification on the 2008 Planning Act that allowed for nationally-significant-
infrastructure-projects (NSIPs) of any type to be accelerated in the planning process,1 
however, this issue we will concede is an area for future research) would be available 
for all energy projects and other infrastructure.  
 
A further example is highlighted in a more recent article by X and Y who again 
focus on nuclear energy and have a comparison with renewables.2  They focus on 
comparing civil nuclear energy development in the UK and Germany. They even assert 
that it is only countries who are slightly less democratic that are considering to build 
nuclear energy (p.62-64). Indeed the authors state that (p.69) “Put simply, the question 
is raised as to whether the main reason for nuclear discontinuity occurring in Germany 
rather than in the UK, is that the latter affords less effective general opportunities for 
                                                        
1 Smith, L. 2015. Planning for Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects. House of Commons 
Library, Briefing Paper Number 06881, 8 June 2015. Available at: 
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN06881  
2 Johnstone P. and Stirling A. 2015. Comparing Nuclear Power Trajectories in Germany And the 
UK: From ‘Regimes’ to ‘Democracies’ in Sociotechnical Transitions and Discontinuities. Science 
Policy Research Unit Working Paper Series, SWPS 2015-18 (June). Available at: 
https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=2015-18-swps-johnston-
stirling.pdf&site=25 
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diverse kinds of democratic pressure and challenge.” The authors also highlight the 
success of renewable energy in Germany.  
 
A familiar story emerges in energy literature that in discussing nuclear energy 
policy, there is always a return to a debate where the discussion is where society has a 
choice between nuclear energy versus renewable energy. We hope to highlight in 
examining the development of the UK Energy Act 2013 that it was an inclusive process 
and that that Act also benefits other energy sources. Further, we advocate that in future 
political economy energy justice debates it is not whether one of nuclear energy or 
renewable energy will be the winner or loser, but that that the focus needs to be on the 
energy system in its entirety. The debate needs to include fossil fuels and if climate 
science and environmental pollution data are examined it is fossil fuel energy sources 
that need to be the losers, and low-carbon energy sources, the winners. 
 
3.3. Uranium Mining: An Australian case study  
 
In this case study of uranium mining in Australia we illustrate the emergence of justice 
as recognition in practice. Throughout, we identify the need to recognise previously 
misrecognised social groups – including, most pertinently in Australia, First Peoples. 
We demonstrate too that recognition alone is not sufficient, and show instead that it 
must be accompanied by due process. Thus we highlight the potential for hidden 
injustices and losers with regards to energy justice.  
 
Geographically, Canada, Kazakhstan, and Australia account for more than half 
of global production of uranium, an estimated 70 per cent of which is mined in the 
traditional lands of First Peoples. 47,48 It is a story well versed that governments permit 
large corporations to undertake mining on their land in exchange for the growth and 
prosperity of their country. However, whilst there are some benefits, such practices can 
be at the detriment of the local area. The potential for negative impacts include, amongst 
others, damage to human health and the local environment, poor economic 
compensation, concerns over sovereignty and indigenous rights and the erosion of 
indigenous social cultures.49,4848 
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Sovacool and Dworkin47 draw attention to the case of the now-closed Rum 
Jungle mine in Australia, where they illustrate widespread environmental damage, 
giving evidence of the discharge of acidic liquid wastes into surrounding creeks and the 
Finniss River, land contamination, and localised land erosion. Socially, too, 
relationships between mining organisations and landowners have typically been 
damaging, characterised by conflict, negative influence and the denial of rights.48 An 
assessment of uranium mining practice within the Kakadu National Park in the 
Northern Territory of Australia, for example, illustrates the use of coercive tactics to 
override opposition. Sovacool and Dworkin47 (p. 168) report that historically ‘operators 
of both the Jabiluka Mine and the Ranger Mine (both of which are within the national 
park’s boundaries) have been documented intimidating, illegally imprisoning, bullying, 
and bribing the indigenous Mirrar people into signing over land rights’. Such cultural 
domination - a form of misrecognition - is common in resource conflicts around the 
world, especially in regard to the relationship between indigenous populations and 
extractive industries.50 
 
In the face of previous malpractice and as the result of increasing attention to 
the social and environmental impacts of uranium mining, including calls to recognise 
the rights of indigenous peoples, the global mining industry has progressively turned to 
the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) to improve their operations.51 
Australia’s three operating mines as well as the sites at which major uranium deposits 
have been discovered, are all situated on the traditional lands of the country’s First 
Peoples.48 Thus, in this context, the mining industry’s focus on CSR necessitates the 
recognition of newly empowered stakeholders, and engaging with affected 
communities in a way which is respectful of their host community’s interests, 
knowledge, concerns and objectives.52,53,48 However, top-down processes for mining 
decision-making commonly lack legitimacy for indigenous stakeholders 54 . In this 
regard our uranium mining case further highlights the political economy of energy 
justice, where recognition justice cannot exist in silo – it requires the presence of 
procedural justice too. At this point, we further develop our case of Australian uranium 
mining. 
 
In Australia, the 1993 Native Title Act has given native populations increasing 
power to negotiate agreements with developers, often ensuring some kind of monetary 
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compensation for social, cultural and environmental damage, as well as employment 
and business development opportunities.55 Yet the Act, a structure designed to increase 
fairness of governance structures, does not ensure exclusive indigenous control over 
lands and resources, especially if the lands contain resources of national interest.56 Take 
for example Banerjee’s56 explorations of the development of the Jabiluka mine in 
Australia. Despite protests from the indigenous Mirrar community and various national 
and international environmental groups, including UNESCO, developments were given 
the all clear. In addition to failing to hear the extensive objections, developers were 
criticised for failing to provide equal opportunity for the Aboriginal population to view 
and comment on environmental reports.56 Thus, despite their recognition, they were 
unable to participate in due process. Jenkins51 (p. 168) rather scathingly states in this 
regard that the Australian mining industry takes a ‘devil may care’ attitude, ‘operating 
in areas without social legitimacy, causing major devastation, and then leaving when 
an area has been exhausted of all economically valuable resources’. 
 
Such examples raise questions of not only who is involved in decision-making, 
but the legitimacy of social inclusion. In this respect it is not sufficient for the state to 
recognise its citizens in equal, legal form - the state and the powers that be must also 
‘establish comparable life chances between citizens through provision of social 
entitlements’.55 Flüeler and Blowers 57  add, in line with the principles of good 
governance, that participating local communities must benefit from their involvement 
in decision-making, and not only via short-term compensation. This is even more the 
case when we consider the use of financial compensation for losses. These payments 
are frequently used to cover the costs of services that the state already has a duty to 
provide e.g. health care and education. Financial payments, therefore, should not be 
substituted for social entitlement.55 
 
4. Operationalising Energy Justice 
 
Our chapter so far has introduced two key ideas; energy justice as it exists in theory, 
and energy injustice as it exists in practice. In providing real-world examples of the 
tenet’s applicability, we have demonstrated the concept’s ability to highlight areas of 
injustice – giving it evaluative reach. Cognisant of such opportunities to improve the 
social performance of our energy systems, there is recognition of the need to address 
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the key political economy questions of ‘who wins, who loses, how and why they relate 
to the existing distribution of energy, who lives with the side effects of its sites of 
extraction, production and generation, and who will bear the social costs of 
decarbonising energy sources and economies’58 (p. 133). Here, our political economy and 
energy justice foci provide real potential. 
 
Through our three brief case studies, we have also sought to demonstrate that 
energy justice is subject to its own political economy - demonstrating in real terms the 
challenges of balancing the winners and losers in the nuclear sector and in balancing 
the tenets of energy justice. By utilising case studies from throughout the nuclear energy 
system, at the stages of uranium mining, energy production and waste, we have further 
highlighted that these winners and losers not only exist on a site-by-site basis, but 
between systems components and across both space and time. We argue here then that 
energy justice, while full of potential, needs to be managed effectively or it is liable to 
endure its own political economy. 
 
As a further illustrator to our discussion above, whilst it is sometimes 
acknowledged that nuclear energy is a low-carbon energy source 59 , Newell and 
Mulvaney58 (p. 138) discuss the frequent presentation of nuclear power as ‘clean’ energy, 
without acknowledgement of its social context, including the environmental injustices 
associated with uranium/yellow cake mining and long-term nuclear waste storage 
problems. They warn, then, of the burdens of nuclear power being unevenly distributed 
internationally, ‘particularly if “clean energy” is pursued without attention to energy 
justice’. Furthermore, nuclear power’s depletion of finite uranium sources, production 
of long-lived nuclear waste and contribution to climate change raises justice questions 
between generational borders.60,30 Indeed, with the issue of nuclear waste in mind, the 
benefits of nuclear power exist primarily for the present generation, leaving the burdens 
of long-lived radioactive waste to future cohorts.61,30 However, this has to be taken into 
the context of all energy sources which all leave waste in some form to future 
generations. 
 
With such dilemmas in mind, many authors argue for a multi-scalar focus; an 
acknowledgement, according to Holifield et al.62 (p. 4), that ‘place-specific policies and 
practices can have consequences that cross national boundaries, affect multiple scales, 
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and extend across global networks’. In this vein, Newell and Mulvaney58 (p.138) comment 
too that the ‘social and spatial dimensions of energy and climate justice force us to 
consider the scope for stronger forms of energy governance beyond the state that are 
able to address these complex relationships’. Such an approach, according to Newell 
and Mulvaney 'reiterates the importance of comprehending the global dimensions of 
the issue in the everyday, increasingly transnational, organisation of production and 
consumption through global supply chains, rather than through the dramatic, site-
specific and more visible instances of environmental justice conflicts and mobilisations 
which feature in much of the literature’.58 (p. 133) Further, such an approach overcomes 
scalar ambiguity and failures to account for actor diversity within the current 
environmental and energy justice literature63. 
 
When a political economy perspective on energy justice is developed with a 
whole systems approach to energy justice, it highlights not just case-specific injustices, 
but also the trade-offs required between different systems components, allowing a full 
social costing of an energy source. In light of this, Heffron and McCauley64 highlight 
the importance of the energy justice concept for two reasons: (1) the assessment of 
justice throughout the supply chain can enable an energy source to be valued at full cost 
and (2) valuing an energy source at full cost will affect whether it is chosen as an energy 
source, and therefore affect energy security. In this regard, Sovacool et al.30 (p. 200) 
comment that ‘the incorporation of considerations of justice into energy policy making 
will alter how we view entire energy systems’. 
 
5. Conclusion: A Future Outlook on Energy Justice in the Energy Sector  
 
Throughout our exploration, we have used three case studies to highlight the merit of a 
political economy approach to energy justice. Our examination of the siting process for 
a Deep Geological Repository for Canadian nuclear waste demonstrated potential 
trade-offs between the tenets of energy justice. Here we showed that procedural justice 
can significantly lengthen the progress for distributional justice, as, over a 40 year 
timespan, demands for extensive consultation in Canada has meant that no site has been 
developed and nuclear waste destined for the DGR remains in aboveground, 
distributed, interim storage. Secondly, in our exploration of the development of the UK 
Energy Act 2013, we examined participation, consultation and due process. We 
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highlighted that through a focus on procedural justice, energy justice can resolve the 
political economy dilemma of having winners and losers from an energy policy 
perspective. Finally, our example of the recognition of indigenous groups surrounding 
uranium mines highlighted the importance of considering not only who is involved in 
decision-making, but the legitimacy of social inclusion; in essence, the necessity of 
operationalising both recognition and procedural justice in tandem. Thus our 
exploration of political economy approaches to energy justice not only provided 
cautionary tales around the implementation of energy justice tenets, but also 
demonstrates how energy justice may be used as a positive tool for resolving political 
economy issues. 
 
With this in mind, we conclude that energy justice offers, firstly, an opportunity 
to develop new crosscutting social science agendas on exploring where injustices occur, 
developing new processes of avoidance and remediation, and recognizing new sections 
of society. It is therefore a paradigm that inspires both evaluative accounts and 
normative solutions for dealing with both the winners and losers in energy policy. 
 
Energy justice provides, secondly, a new framework for bridging existing and 
future research on energy production and consumption. The hitherto competing 
discourses are united in the common goal of achieving just energy-based processes and 
outcomes. 
 
Lastly, it sets out a three-pronged framework for assessing the winners and 
losers. Distributional and recognition-based injustices in the siting of nuclear waste and 
mining infrastructures are evoked above within the context of opposition and developer 
movements, highlighting trade-offs between energy justice’s core tenets. With regards 
to procedural justice, our case highlights that energy justice can resolve the political 
economy dilemma of having winners and losers from an energy policy perspective.   
 
Our whole-system analysis suggests that the contribution of political economics 
in energy policy requires, more generally, to be revised. Economics, more specifically, 
needs to better accommodate (1) other disciplines in its calculations for modeling and 
analysis and (2) inherent physical attributes of whole energy systems. This call for a 
new direction is driven by several concerns. Pre-eminent among these is the 
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unacknowledged reliance on the same economic thinking, the Chicago neo-classical 
economic perspective, which has created the current unjust distribution of winners and 
losers. This economic viewpoint and its drive for competition have led to the current 
malaise of many sectors in the economy. At the same time, investments in energy 
policies such as nuclear involve a buy-in to the physical constraints of its whole energy 
system. In this way, we must develop new concepts such as energy justice as a means 
to investigate the injustices of both economic thinking and physical realities. 
 
Dominant neo-classical economic thinking continues therefore to prop up the 
‘physical frameworks of injustice’ of whole energy systems. Because of word 
limitations here we are unable to investigate fully the relationship between physically 
generated injustices in whole energy systems and economic social systems, though we 
note that this area is ripe for future research. We call, in any case, for a reflection on 
what contribution energy justice can make to our adaptation and mitigation strategies. 
Further, we propose, as an area of further research, that scholars develop energy justice 
metrics as a new tool for costing energy infrastructural projects with an explicit link to 
whole energy system implications. This builds on the energy justice matrix or checklist 
proposed by Sovacool and his peers30, where through the matrix or checklist it is 
possible to assess the justice ‘performance’ and true social impacts of our energy 
system – though this matrix / checklist is a qualitative and potentially subjective 
process.  Metrics, however, are more precise in their approach and aim to directly 
connect with economists and early work has been started in this regard.3 Thus the aim 
of energy justice inspired metrics is to incorporate them into economist’s models, and 
deliver a concept which has a value that can be calculated and costed so that the 
consequence of its application can be more easily understood by the public, ensuring, 
we hope, more just energy outcomes. 
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